2022 Online Economic Workshop:
War & The Economy
War & The Economy
December 5th, 7th, & 9th
Each Panel Starts Noon EST
December 5th, 7th, & 9th
Each Panel Starts Noon EST
War takes weapons, supplies, and people. War relies on economies to fuel it while creating events or demands that reshape these economies. The 2022 Online Economic History Workshop solicited for papers on on the ability or degradation of an economy and society to sustain fighting a war.
The Myth of Wartime Prosperity: Canadian Evidence
By: Casey Pender, Carleton University
Vincent Geloso, George Mason University
Pender & Geloso construct a new price deflator to account for wartime price controls in Canada and military spending. They find That once output is adjusted with their price deflator that real output is 11% lower in 1918 and 30% lower in 1945 Compared to traditional measure of real output. The decline, combined with other economic measures suggests that the idea of wartime prosperity is likely a myth.
The Decline of U.S. Manufacturing Productivity Between 1941 and 1948
By: Alexander Field, Santa Clara University
Field argues against the conventional wisdom that learning by doing producing military durables during the Second World War established the supply side foundation for the golden age of U.S. economic growth. He demonstrates that manufacturing productivity declined during the war (and explains why) and that it grew more slowly in the postwar period than had been true during the interwar years
Deception through Credible Commitment:
Secret Inflationary Finance in Israel’s War of Independence
By: Dror Goldberg, The Open University of Israel
Goldberg documents how Israel’s War of Independence was largely finance by secrete loans from the Anglo-Palestine Bank. The loans increased the money supply without increasing the currency. Publicly the bank and government committed not to drastically increase currency while secretly increasing the other component of money supply. The action was part of a successful campaign to deceive the general population and its enemies from knowing the desperate fiscal situation.
Who Lost (or Won) China?
By: Peiyuan Li, University of Colorado Boulder
Li argues that farmers who took over land from landlords after the Chinese Communist Party land reform, were more likely to fight (die) if there was a legitimate threat Kuomintang government would retake the territory and restore land ownership back to the landlords. Li provides evidence that the redistribution of property (land) is a viable way to build political support to sustain and fuel a faction in an armed conflict.
When Nation Building Goes South:
Draft Evasion, Government Repression, and the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia
By: Gianni Marciante, University of Warwick
Marciante provides evidence that coercive nation building can foster organized crime, specifically, the implementation of conscription foster the growth of the Sicilian mafia. Marciante work builds on the ideas of Fouka (2020) and Dehdari & Gehring (2022), among others that coercive nation building policies lacking appropriate economic incentives may bring cultural resistance by minority communities. For example, the minority targeted by the forced assimilation reforms might turn to local agents (mafia-type organizations) to seek protection from government law enforcers, in order to preserve their distinctive cultural heritage.